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The notion that the cost of increasing family size depends upon the level of expenditures or investment per child (child quality), formalized in Becker and Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973) , provides a rationale for the contemporaneous inter-country negative correlation between the schooling attainment of young persons and birth rates as well as the trends in these variables over time in developed countries during their demographic transition. A sufficient condition for fertility to fall and, say, schooling to rise as development proceeds in this framework is that the shadow-price constant income effect on quality per child 1 exceed that on numbers of children.
Such an explanation, however, would appear :..o be of little value for those who hold that population growth itself impedes economic development (e.g., Coale and Hoover (1958) ). From this perspective, the compensated substitution. implications of the theory are of concern, whereby price interventions which impinge on family size decisions can be used to accelerate pe~-capita income.
The chief focus of policies aimed at reducing fertility in the absence of income growth appears to be on altering the "own" price of children through lowering information costs associated with contraceptive methdos in order to take advantage of recent innovations in birth control technolo~y.
In this paper, we examine both theoretically and empirically the natalist impact of two alternative potential policies--reductions in the price of schooling and tech~ological innovation in the agricµltural context--based on a rural household model in which (school) investments per child influence the cost of children as in the Becker-Lewis framework and in which the returns to schooling rise in a dynamic environment as a consequence of the allocative effect of education (Welch, 1970; Schultz, 1975) . I show that, as a consequence of the "quantity-quality" interaction, reductions in the direct costs of schooling may raise fertility levels even if child schooling and the quantity of children are substitutes as conventionally defined and even if (observed) income effects are not positive.2
However, we also show that if schooling improves allocative skills, the interaction makes it likely that an acceleration in the flow of agricultural innovations will tend to depress fertility, even if schooling and family size are complements, with the magnitude of the effect depending on the degree of competitiveness in the rural labor market.
Household data from India which contain cross-sectional variations in the price of schooling and in which a proportion of households were exposed to a governmental program providing increased access to the continuous flow of new, high-yielding grain varieties associated with the '!!reen revolution' are used to obtain estimates of the natalist impact of the alternative policies. Particular attention is paid in the empirical analysis to the use of these data to simulate a 'natural' policy experiment by the merging of the household information with district-level data. In particular, attempts are made to distinguish the response of households to the impact of technological change from cross-sectional differences in behavior associated with unobserved geographical characteristics which persist over time and which, because of the behavior of policy-makers, may be correlated with the presence of a policy intervention (Guttman, 1978) .
The empirical estimates confirm both the quantity-quality interaction and allocative efficiency hypotheses,indicating that farm family fertility declined and school enrollment increased in areas affected by the dissemination of novel agricultural inputs compared to other farm households. Moreover, fertility in non-farm households was higher in those areas where local schools were easily accessible despite evidence consistent with schooling and numbers of children being substitutes.
In section I the basic model is formulated in two variants which define the spectrum of developing country rural labor market assumptions perfect labor mobility and the absence of a market for labor services.
Section II contains a description of the data and the empirical framework, production. The reMaininz tine in each period is spent in t~e lahor market where\: is the first period (child) ,,•age and w represents the market "rental" n rate of hunan ca:iital or schoolin~ services (1/1 q). r,!e characterize a "market lahor" economv as 1 > a . " 0 and a "sur?lus labor"economy uy-J . a 1 , n 2 ~ l . Both cases are considered below.
Farm income is produced according to a production function r in which all variable inputs except the labor of the children, L 1 , are supressed and farm scale A is assumed fixed. Total householJ income in the first period, with Ij representin~ non-earnings income in period j and a unit f arn output price, is:
Total income in the second period is:
y represents the farm's proportionate advance in technology from period 1 to 2 which for simplicity is assumed to augment production in a Hicks-neutral way. The degree to which output is enhanced is given by the adoption function (4) (4) y = y (i, q) whose inputs are the exogenous flow of innovations i (technological progress) and q, the per-child level of schooling. The dynamic allocative effect of schooling is thus represented by the positive cross-partials of the y function. The adoption function has been expressed without the quantity of children as an argument. While it would appear that given the small scale of Indian farms, increasing the number of children of given quality would have a minimal effect on the rate of adoption, the necessary critical assumption, as will be shown below, is that an increase in the expected flow of innovations does not augment the productivity of N in adoption.
Schooling is also assumed for generality to augment the productivity of a given number of children in farm production and to enhance market earnings power even in the absence of technological innovation. Neither of these latter assumptions are crucial to the implications of the model.
The two-period income constraint, ignoring discounting, is tl-ius:
wha-e IT is the shadow price of S and IT is the non-time price of schooling s q (books, tuition, direct transportation costs).
a. Market Labor Hodel
We first consider the market labor case in which the children participate in both farm production and in the labor narket; there are no impediments to labor mobility between "own" and other farms or sectors within a p,eographical area. In this case aj is less than one and it can be easily shown that ar/a1 1 = 1~ and (1 + y) ar/aL 2 = w for any (non-zero) values cf N and ~· Maximization of (1) subject to (4) and (5) yields the first-order conditions: The full shadow prices of l~ and q have ttm components--a 'common' component TIQ, which is Multiplied by the level of the other commodity and consists of the direct cost of schooling plus time costs less the rental value of a unit of schooling services, and a 'unique' component? For the quantity of children, this latter is the child wage, which off sets in part the other costs of increasing ~Q) -1nd which is independent of the lev<!ls of eitiler q or N. The unique price component for q represents the innovational returns to schooling, which is, of course, dependent on both the quantity of children and the level of q.
From (6) and (7) it can be seen that because the non-ti~e cost of schooling II enters the shadat,' prices of both q and N, a change in this q price will have direct ("own") and indirect ("cross") effects on both commodities, while a change in the effectiveness with which q raises farm putput through adoption will have only an indirect price effect on the quantity of children and a direct price effect on q. More rigorously, by differentiating totally (5), (6), (7), and (8) we obtain the total effects of changing the direct cost of schooling on q and N, where + is the determinant of the bordered Hessian, the $ are the relevant cofactors and re oq/oF and oN/oF are observed income elasticities:
Second-order conditions constrain the first terms (corresponding to the conventional compensated O'Wll price effects) in (9) and (10) to be negative (15) and (16):
The market labor model thus indicates that as a consequence of the dependency of the price of N on q, the direction of the effect of an introduction of a school subsidy on fertility cannot be predicted while augmenting the flow of agricultural technological innovations is likely to both increase schooling and lower family size, the effects being proportional to farm size. The model also indicates that birth rates will be higher and school enrollment likely lower where child wages are high.
b. Surplus Labor Hodel
In a setting in which most farm family members are not participants in . 6 the wage labor market as eiti1er buyers or sellers of labor services, as depicted in the "peasant" models of Sen (1966) and aazumdar (1975), or where labor marginal product is not closely related to observed wages (Ranis and Fei (1961) , the marginal product of labor services in farm production is affected directly by the levels of N and q chosen. First order conditions for N and q, given by (6a) and (7a), have however, the (6a) (7a) same structure, .with common and unique price components, as in' the market model. Accordingly, the effects of a changein IT on N and q are equally q ambiguous, with the relevant expressions the same as (9) and (10) except for mutatis mutandis changesin the bordered Hessian and cofactors. Denoting these by ¢ 1 and ¢ 1 rc' the relationship between the sign of the cross price effects in the surplus labor model and the usual complementary-substitutability expression is given by:
Again, the unique cross price effect is likely to be positive because of the interaction between q and family size even if N and q are complements in the Hicks-Slutsky sense.
The direction of the relationship between the rate of technical change and q and N, given by (13a) and (14a) depends, howeve~ on the magnitude of the marginal product of labor, in contrast to the market case • ra 2 y ..,
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Here, because of the constraints (assumed) on off-farm labor supply, the increase in i directly effects the returns to (child) labor in the second period. The fertility effect (14a) thus contains a positive first term as well as a negative cross effect, leading to an ambiguous result.
If the marginal product of labor is quite low, a likely situation where the wage labor market is inoperative, however, the negative terms in (13a) and (14a) It should be noted that the predicted effects of technical innovation on fertility in each of the two models were derived under ceteris paribus assumptions, holding, in particular, wage rates constant in the market model. The total effects of sustained technical progress may thus be quite different from those derived if the labor market model is relevant, as such change may alter the demand for and supply of labor and thus alter wage rates. To the extent that wages do enter into the shadow prices of N and q, as does W in the first model and, the wife'i wage is n also a component of ITQ , (Willis, 1973; Ben-Porath, 1973) , the signs of the total effects of a change in i cannot be predicted. Horeover, families not directly benefitting from the technical progress, such as households without land, may as well alter their fertility decisions in response to the wage rate (demand) consequences of technical progress. In the empirical section, attention is thus paid to the distinction between the direct ceteris paribus technical change effects on N and q and those channelled through wages. To the extent that those former affects should be most relevant to farm (landed) households if schooling augments allocation skills, an additional prediction of the analysis is that, controlling for wage effects, there should be little or no impact of agricultural technical progress on the fertility or schooling behavior of non-farmers.
II. Empirical Analysis a. Natural and guasi-natural Experiments
The preceding tleoretical framework suggests that although the impact of agricultural development through refueling technological innovation is more likely to have an anti-natalist impact than will school improvement as a consequence of the q-N interaction, empirical analysis is ultimately required. The quantitative magnitudes and direction of the effects of these potential policy tools on birth rates were shown to depend on the unknown preference structures of the households in the case of the cost of schooling and on the competitiveness of the rural labor market with respect to innovation, chara0teristics which cannot be determined a priori. To estimate the effects of sustained agricultural technical change and a school subsidy on fertility (and schooling) it is necessary, however, to obtain data based on an receive on a continuing basis technical assistance and assured supplies of fertilizer. By 1971 households in these districts, identified in the survey data, were subject to a significantly greater flow of new techniques, chiefly those associated with the "green revolution" high yielding grain varieties, over a 7 to 10 year span compared to prior periods. Moreover, the program was expected to continue at its outset and was funded throughout 7 the period. A second relevant "experiment" contained in these data is the existence of villages with no primary schools,(5 percent), with households residing in such villages facing therefore significantly greater schooling costs.
The principal discrepency between the ideal or natural experimental data and the "quasi-natural" experiments contained in the Indian survey is that the districts selected for the IADP and the non-school villages were not necessarily chosen randomly. If the IADP districts were selected because of pre-program characteristics correlated with fertility or schooling, for example, a variable representing the presence of a household in an IADP district will reflect district-level differences in serially correlated unmeasured variables as well as the impact of the flow of new technologies.
To obtain a more precise measure of exogenous agricultural developMent, regression methods can be used to purge the IADP variable of some of the pre-program systematic components. A dummy variable taking on the value of one if· a district was chosen for IADP was regressed against a set of district characteristics, including schooling levels, pertaining to sixty-eight of the eighty-eight districts represented in the sample survey based on pre-IADP 1961 census daaa. Use of the residuals from this regression, reported below, which are orthogonal to the variables chacterizing the level of development prior to the introduction of the program, should provide a less biased estimate of the impact of agricultural develo~ent in a regression explaining fertility in 1971 than the district-level IADP variables.
An additional undesirable characteristic of the quasi-natural experinents portrayed in the Iudian data, based on geographical differences in the policy variables, is that while an individual household cannot have influenced IADP implementation and school presence, a correlation of "tastes" for children and schooling with these geographical variables may be ~resent in the data as a result of selective migration. Apparent imperfections in the land markt:-t which make the purchase and sale of land very difficult (Bardhan, 1977) greatly reduce, however, the mobility of farm households, those hypothesized to be most affected by IADP. Moreover, while such considerations are less applicable to landless, wage worl:ers, interdistrict mobility appears to be quite low in India (Rosenzweig, 1978) . We mi~ht thus expect that the relationships between the village-level school variable and the fertility of non-farm households would contain the only serious b:la s, al though it 1
would appear that such bias should not obfuscate the sign of the "true"
relationships. We present some evidence on intervillage as well as interdistrict mobility below. .
The n (x) are the "natural" birth rates of women aged x taken from the fertility schedule constructed from ten non-contracepting populations by Coale and Trussell (1974) . The f (x)k are the actual births of married woman k aged x in each year. The birth ratio measure (BRAT) thus reflects the degreee to which a woman reduced or "controlled" her fertility relative to a biological benchmark at any age in the 2. 
where m is age at marriage. This fertility measure is thus standardized both for the duration of marriage and age of of the woman and reflects the average level of fertility control practised from marriage to the cutoff date marking the start of IADP, The properties of· this fertility variable are described in Boulier and Rosenzweig (1978) . As can be seen from (18) and (19), DRAT is simply BRAT cumulated back to m from 1964.
Total cumulative fertility may also differ between women o.f a given· age because of differences in the age at marriage as well as due to differences in marital fertility control. ARAT, given by (20), is an age-standardized (20) CEBa-7. in school in each household was divided by the predicted number in school based on the sample average single-year enrollment rates and the 5-14 age distribution of the household. The enrollment measure is thus:
where P (x) is the sample proportion of children aged x in school, c (x)ik is variable which takes on the value of one if the ith child aged x in household k is in school and nk is the number of children 5-14 in the household .. 12
The sub-sample of households chosen for estimation purposes consists of those with spouse-present married women, aged 25-40 "1ith at least one surviving child aged 5 to 14, residing in the 68 districts which could he matched with aggregate district data. The reduced-form equations for each of the four dependent variables (18) These are estimated separately for households cultivating farm land (farmers) and non-cultivating w~ge or salary worker households (non-farmers). All the variables employed are defined in Table 1 , which also provides sample means 13 and st~ndard deviations.
Because only 50 percent of the males and 25 percent of the females in the farm households participated in the wage labor market as sellers of labor services, wages were estimated using an instrumental variables procedure in which the natural logarithim of the daily wage rates earned by male and feraale adult market participants were regressed against a set of personal, village-level and district characteristics. The specifications employed are given by (23) A regression similar to those specified in (23) The household production of child "quality", which should be positively correlated with schooling if pre-school investments contribute to learning efficiency, as depicted in most human capital accumulation models (Ben-Porath, 1968; Heckman, 1976) , has been hypothesized to require significant quantities of the mother's time (Mincer, 1962; Willis, 1973) . This hypothesis would suggest that in the labor market model of agriculture, increases in the value of the wife's wage in addition to increasing the returns to fer.iale (17), such as mean land size and distritution, do not, however, a?pear to account for any of the variation in male ot female wage ~ates, as none of the IADP coefficients attain statistical significance.
The second-stage enrollment estimates are presented in Table 3 for farm and non-farm households. As is consistent with the labor market model, the child wage has a negative effect while the adult male wage is positively • Instrumental variable.
,:. w associated with enrollment in both sub-samples. The nale Hage effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all specifications while the child wage coefficients are statistically significant (.05 level) in the specifications with the RES variable. Consistent with the price of time argument, the femalewage displays a negative coefficient, again in both types of households.
Income effects appear to be strong--the t~THY coefficients, positive and statistically significant in the farm suu-sample, indicate an incone elasticity of enrollment of about .5 while the ;~THY coefficients in the non-farm sub-sample, not neasured with much precision, indicate an income elasticity of about .1.
School enrollment in farm households appears to be fro~ 19 to 22 percent lov.'er where villages do not have a school. As expected, farm household school enrollment is also significantly higher in the districts chosen for !ADP. Ilm.;ever, when the RES measure is used in place of t'."le IADP dununy th is differential drops from 30 to 17 percent. The latter results are thus consistent with hypothesis that parents on -farms perceive the rise in returns to schooling investment when exposed to increased flows of new techniques, although the relationship is du.e in part to a positive incoue effect. Moreover, while the !ADP coefficient is of sir.ilar magnitude in ti1e non-farr.i suh-sample compared to that in the f arrr. sanple, when the pre-IADP district cl1aracteristics are purged from the !ADP variable in specification (17) the coefficient drops substantially helo\'
tlat int e arm ouseno equation. poo e regression spec cation ~ with slope dummies representing farm status, indicates that the differen~e in the !~ES coefficients across household type is statistically sipnificant at the .05 level. The interaction coefficients in specfications (3) and (4), howeve~, ~hile of tl1e correct sign, do not sunport the hypothesis that the returns to scl10oling are higher on laqrer farms.
Of the other variables, farm size does not arrear to have an iLlµortant influence on school enrollment, indicating that marginal values of time may be substantially captured by the imputed v.·age variables. '.!oreover, school enrollment appears to be significantly higher in villages that are at least partly industrialized, as represented by the presence of a factory, with the effect significantly stronRer in farm householdi.
The Tobit BRAT coefficients, estirnated usinr. naxinuM-likelihood, are reported in Table 4 . These also appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that farm households respond much more stronr,ly to agricultural technical change in terms of their fertility behavior than do non-farn households.
Birth rates in fdrn households are about eleven percent lower, controlling for the wage effects of technical change, in districts •:here the flo~rs of ne\,; technologies ~-:ere raore rapid, while no significant differences in birth rates are exhibited by the non-farm households in the !ADP districts. This result appears robust to the measure!'lent of IADP variable. The cross-price effect in (14) thus appears tobe positive in farm households and to dominate the income effect; •:hich appears fror.i the 17 WLTHY coefficients to be very small. Moreover, the pre-IADP fertility estimates, reported in Table 5 , indicate that prior to the introduction of the new .
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ainstrumental variable.
technologies, no significant differene€ in either marital fertility control (DRAT) or total cumulative fertility (ARAT) existed between farm households, although total fertility may have been slightly lower ar.iong non-farm households in the districts that were ultimately chosen for the program.
In contrast to the IADP and RES estimates, n:.one of the coefficients of the school presence variables achieve statistical significance l1y conventional standards in the BRAT equations and, as is consistent •-'ith the interactive quantity-quality model, where schools are present (IT is low), fertility q rates of the non-farm households are higher. This latter result indicates the dominance of the negative own price over the positive cross price effect (given the low income elasticity of children). ~toreover, the presence of factories, which appeared to increase enrollnent rates, also is positively associated with birth rates in farm and non-farm households;
industrialization without sustained technical chanre thus does not appear to necessarily lower fertility.
As in the enrollment equations, the child wage coefficients display signs in accord with the predictions of the model, being positively associated with birth rates in the two sub-samples. The negative coefficients on the wife's wag~ appear to additionally support the price of time hypothesis and parallel the results obtained by Rosenzweir. and Evenson (1977) based on district-level data from India for lq61. As was noted, because the adult male and female wage rates enter the common shadow price of q and N, the former reducing and the latter on net augmentinr ITQ, the adult wage coefficients should echo the SCJIL effects in sign patterns.
Since the positive LWH and negative LWW coefficients in all equations indicate the pervasive domination of own over cross urice effects, the nefative sign of the school presence variable coefficient in the farm household subsample fertility equation represents the only result inconsistent with the structure of the model. Thus in the 5x4 matrix of adult wage, son.. and RES coefficient signs for the two dependent variables in the two sub-samples, only one sign is "wrong" (al~hough not statistically significant).
The estimates reported in Tables 3 a11d 4 Computation of the total \.rage and direc~ affects of the IADP-related disequilibria, from the RES coefficients in Tables 2 and 4, indicate that where IADP was introduced birth rates fell by 12 percent in farm households and by 5 percent in.non-farm families, the latter due almost totally to the increase in the female wage. By summing over age-specific birth rates in the two sub-samples from the mean ages at marriage to age 45, these reductions would translate into a decrease in completed family size of .72 and .32 children respectively. Aside from the qualifications already discussed, these last estimates must be interpreted with caution, however, as they are conditional on a constant marriage age, which itself may change in response to agricultural development.
III. Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to integrate in a single model the theoretical literature on the interaction between the quantity of and investment in children with that on the allocative roles of schooling in a dynamic context to shed light on the effects of educational subvention 32 '
and agricultural innovation on fertility change in a developing country context. Household data from India which contain a geographically selective agricultural development program promoting technical change to farmers and village-level differences in school accessability were used to estimate the effects of changes in the shadow prices of children and schooling investments per child on fertility and school enrollment. The empirical estimates were consistent with the model, suggesting that farm households responded to their exposure to new agricultural inputs by both increasin~ schooling investment and by lowering family size even though the ne~ technology appeared to increase the demand for labor services. However, school proximity, while increasing schooling, appeared to be either negligibly or positively correlated with birth rates. These results thus indicate that the returns to investments in agricultural research and dissemination in terms of their efficacy in promoting economic development may he even higher in a country such as India than those high levels already documented (Evenson and Kislev, 1975 (1976) it is shown that i f the contribution of child endowments to total child quality is taken into account, the "true"
income elasticities of numbers of children and child quality may be equal and of average magnitude but economic development may depress fertility and raise investments in children. However, it is also pointed out that 35 an increase in the rate of exogenous income growth, by augmenting endowments relative to potential income, will tend to raise family size and lower expenditures on children. In this paper we argue that accelerations in economic growth brought about by technical change also invoke price effects which are likely to cause fertility to fall as a consequence of the interaction between the quantity and quality of children.
5 While child endowments are not explicitly considered in the model to reduce complexity, in the context of a developing country we would expect that the ratio of total to endowed child quality would be quite low. Becker and Tomes (1976) show that this implies that the observed income elasticity for numbers of children is likely to be substantially lower than that for child schooling. This implication is confirmed below.
6 rt is shown in Rosenzweig (1977) lOTo see the implications of the biological constraint on fertility due to the covariance between age and fecundity, consider the following simple non-stochastic identity f(a)=n(a)•(l -p), where f (a) is the birth rate of a woman in age interval a, n(a) is her potential fertility at age a and (1-p) is the degree to which fertility is controlled. If fertility control is a linear function of a set of X variables such that (1 -p) = BX, then the effect of a change in any X. on f is af = n(a)· B., which is a function of 1 -1 ax the age of the woman, since a 2 f(a) = anfa) ,B .
• Division of actual births 1 axi aa aa by an approximation to potential fertility (natural fertility) results in the equation f(a)/N(a) = (1 -p) BRAT, whose derivatives are independent of age. An alternative procedure, stratification of the sample into narrow age groups, would also reduce the problem but would result in a reduction in degrees of freedom, with consequent loss of estimation precision. For a more complete discussion, see Boulier ;:mil Rosenzweig (1978) .
11 Natural fertility should not be confused with maximum fertility.
Populations displaying natural fertility behavior are similar with respect to age-patterns of birth rates, but differ in fertility levels. The bias in linear estimating equations which do not take biological constraints into account arises from the non-linear age pattern of fecundity, reflected in the n(x) schedule.
12 Note that the standardization procedure employed is superior to the use of dunnny variables as regressors depicting the age-composition of children since such variables will reflect, in part, family size.
13 The extent to which actual . fertility is depressed below potential fertility may vary with age, as is true in the sample population studied.
An age variable was thus included as a regressor in all the fertility equations. For women in farm households in the 4 5-year age groups 25-40, birth rates are .550, .407, .272 and .152 respectively while the birth ratios (BRAT) are .499, .390, .304, .236. 14 rt will be recalled that school and factory presence were found to be positively associated. 17 The relative magnitudes of the estimated income effects in the birth rate and enrollment equations are consistent with the hypothesis proposed by Becker and Tomes, given the relative importance of child endowments in child quality in a country such as India. However, it should be noted that the WLTHY coefficients reflect past savings decisions which may in part be correlated with preferences for numbers of children versus child quality.
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